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PETITION FOR REHEARING 
Pursuant to the provisions of Rule 76{e), U.R.C.P., 
Plaintiffs-Respondents, David Russell and Eileen Russell, 
petition this Court for a rehearing of the within appeal and a 
reconsideration of its decision herein as it relates to the 
matters hereafter set forth. 
Petitioners respectfully submit that this Court has 
erred in its decision of the appeal herein in that~ 
1. It has premised its decision on erroneous 
assumptions of fact and law, having wrongly assumed: 
a. That the trial court did not take 
evidence of damages in the hearing preceding the 
entry of judgment below; 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
b. That evidence of damages was not 
presented under the legal theory set out in 
Section 61-l-22(l)(b) of the Utah Uniform 
Securities Act; and 
c. That the judgment entered exceeded the 
specific prayer of the Complaint. 
2. The Court's mistake as to the facts respecting 
the procedure followed and evidence taken by the trial court 
goes to the very heart of the appellate court's decision that 
the judgment herein should not be affirmed as it ~as entered 
below. 
3. The decision herein should clearly show that the 
case is remanded to the trial court for "modification" of the 
judgment in accordance with the instructions of this appellate 
court, and is not "reversed" in the sense of vacating the 
judgment. 
Acc0rdingly, your petitioners pray: 
1. That the Court grant a rehearing of the appeal 
herein and reconsider its decision heretofore pronounced as it 
relates to the matters hereinabove set forth1 
2. That the Court amend its decision herein as 
requested, affirm the judgment entered below and grant costs 
and attorneys' fees to Plaintiffs-Respondents1 or, 
3. In the event the Court declines to amend its 
decision as requested, it clarify its decision so as to show 
-2-
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that the judgment below is modified, not reversed, and that 
the instructions given in its said opinion are intended to 
c1irect the trial court as to the standards to be followed in 
modifying the judgment heretofore entered below. 
The facts, authorities and arguments upon which 
petitioners rely are set out in the brief in support of this 
petition which follows hereafter. 
-3-
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BRIEF IN SUPPORT 
OF 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
NATURE OF P~TITION 
On January 30, 1984, this Court filed its opinion in 
this appeal affirming the decision below in part and directing 
that upon remand the judgment below be·modified in accordance 
with said opinion. A copy of that opinion is appended hereto 
as Exhibit "A" for the convenience of the Court. 
Plaintiffs-Respondents (hereinafter called 
"Respondents") have petitioned the Court for a rehearing of 
its decision herein on the ground that the Court has 
misconstrued or overlooked.material facts respecting the 
cecord and the trial court's actions which may affect the 
result of this appeal. Also, Respondents have requested that 
in the event the Court declines to amend its decision as 
r8quested, the Court clarify its said decision to show that 
the judgment is remanded to the trial court for moctification 
in accordance with the opinion and is not "reversed" in the 
sense of vacating the judgment. 
Respondents' petition takes issue with that portion 
of part II of the opinion other than the portion declining to 
disturb the default of Mills (see pages 3 and 4 of Exhibit 
"A"). 
-4-
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ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The issues presented for review are these: 
1. Did the trial court take evidence on the issue of 
the damages as well as attorney's fees and otherwise 
comply with the requirements of Rules 54(c)(2) and 55(b)(2), 
U.R.C.P., before entering its Order for Judgment and Judgment 
below? 
2. If so, are those facts so material as to requir8 
a review of the opinion and a rehearing of the portion of th~ 
Court's decision that was premised on the assumption that the 
trial court did not take evidence of damages and otherwise 
comply with the requirements of Rules 54(c)(2) and 55(b)(2), 
U.R.C.P., before entering its Order and Judgment below. 
3. Should the Court, in the event it declin8s to 
change its opinion as requested, remand the case for 
modification. of the existing judgment in accordance with its 
opinion without reversing or vacating the existing judgment? 
RELIEF SOUGHT 
The relief sought is as follows: 
1. That the Court grant a cehearing of the appeal 
herein and reconsider its decision heretofore pronounced as it 
relates to the matters hereinabove set forth; 
2. That the Court amend its decision herein as 
requested, affirm the judgment entered below and grant costs 
and attorneys' fees to Plaintiffs-Respondents; or, 
-5-
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3. In the event the Court declines to amend its 
decision as requested, it clarify its decision so as to show 
that the judgment below is modified, not reversed, and that 
the instructions given in its said ·opinion are intended to 
direct the trial court as to the standards to be followed in 
modifying the judgment heretofore entered below. 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
This Court has previously instructed litigants to 
seek rehearing only in certain limited circumstances and not 
as a regular practice. Cummings, et ux. v. Nielson, et al, 42 
Utah 157, 129 P. 619 (1912 and 1913) at page 624, Justice 
Frick speaking for the Court, states: 
"We desire to add a word in conclusion 
respecting the numerous applications for 
rehearings in this court. To make an 
application for a rehearing is a matter of 
right, and we have no desire to discourage 
the practice of filing petitions Eor 
rehearings in proper cases. When this 
court, however, has considered and decided 
all of the material questions involved in a 
case, a rehearing should not be applied 
for, unless we have misconstrued or 
overlooked some material fact or facts, or 
have overlooked some statute or decision 
which may affect the result, or that we 
have based the decision on some wrong 
principle of law, or have either misapplied 
or overlooked something which materially 
affects the result." 
* * * * 
"If there are some reasons, however, such 
as we have indicated above, or other good 
reasons, a petition for a rehearing should 
be promptly filed ••. " 
-6-
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Further, this Court has admonished litigants that if 
they wish to complain of directions given by the appellate 
court to the trial ~ourt they must do so before remittit11r. 
Mendelson, et al. v. Roland, 69 Utah 507, 256 P. 544 (1927) ~t 
page 545, states as follows: 
"Wh~n we remanded the case, we directed the 
trial court to do the one or the other in 
his discretion. If we erred in that, the 
plaintiffs, by petition before the 
remittitur went down, could have called our 
attention to it, and, if erroneous, could 
have had it corrected. This they did not 
do. It is too late to complain of it 
now ••• " 
Since Respondents earnestly contend that the Court 
has misconstrued or overlooked material facts clearly in the 
record or wrongly understood those facts in interpreting the 
record and has based its opinion on those assumed, 
misconstrued or overlooked facts, this is a proper case for 
rehearing. Further, since Respondents will 16se any right to 
request the Court to clarify its instructions to the trial 
court if it does not raise the matter now, this is an 
appropriate time to request the Court make it clear that the 
trial court is to modify, not vacate, the existing judgment. 
In its Order for Final Judgment below (R-36), a copy 
of which is included herein for ease of reference as Exhibit 
"B," the trial court recited: 
" ••. and the Court having examined the 
issues and taken testimony and being fully 
advised in the premises, ••• " (Underlining 
added.) 
-7-
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This Court, apparently relying upon appellant's bald and 
unsupported statement in Appellant's Brief that the only 
evidence taken was that of ~ttorney's fees and implying fro~ 
the argument in Respondents' Brief (an erroneous argument 
given to support a contention that all that was ·needed below 
was testimony of attorney's fees and not dealing with the fact 
that testimony of damages as well as attorney's fees was, in 
fact, taken at the hearing below) that Respondents conceded 
that the trial court hearing was limited to attorney's fees, 
ov~rlooked the fact that the trial court correctly interpreted 
the pleadings, properly applied Section 61-l-22(l)(b) as 
pleaded and took testimony under oath at the hearing of the 
Motion for Entry of Judgment against defendant Mills as to the 
amount of damages recoverable under said provision of the Utah 
Uniform Securities Act--as is more fully discussed below. 
In the belief that affidavits may be provided even at 
the appellate stage to clarify or explain the trial court's 
record, and particularly the wording used by the trial court 
in its orders or judgments, Respondents have filed in this 
Court and appended to this Brief the affidavit of the attorney 
who was sworn and who testified, stating that he was sworn and 
the substance of his testimony and identifying the exhibits 
adduced (Exhibit "D" hereto); the affidavit of the Judge who 
signed the Order and Judgment (Exhibit "E" hereto): and the 
affidavit of the Deputy Clerk who entered the Default and 
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attested the Order for Final Judgment and Judgment (Exhibit 
"F" hereto). The affidavits of the Judge and Deputy Clerk are 
included so that the appellate court can be assured that none 
of the three persons involved has a different recollection of 
the occasion than that of attorney Hardy. 
These affidavits, when read in light of the Complaint 
and the ambiguous promissory note which are before this Court, 
establish beyond doubt that judgment below was based on the 
statutory damages provisions of the securities statutes 
pleaded, and was properly entered in accordance with the 
requirements of Rule 55(b)(2): and was not based upon a 
calculation of amounts due under the promissory note itself 
pursuant to Rule 55(b)(l), as this appellate court erroneously 
assumed and recited in its opinion. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The following facts pertinent to this petition appear 
from the record before this Court: 
1. In Counts IV and V of the Complaint, the counts 
seeking recovery from defendant Mills, the plaintiffs alleged 
that they were damaged by Mills' breach of the securities laws 
in the sum of $55,200.00. (R-6 & 7) 
2. In the prayer for relief against defendant Mills, 
plaintiffs specifically prayed for judgment against defendant 
Mills on said securities counts "in the amount of Fifty-Five 
Thousand Two Hundred Dollars ($55,200.00), together with 
-9-
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interest at the rate of eight percent (8%) per annum from 
October 1, 1979, as well as plaintiffs' costs in this action 
and a reasonable attorney's fee, as provided under Section 
61- 1- 2 2 , Utah Code Ann • ( 1 9 5 3 ) " ( R - 9 & 1 0 ) 
3. The judgment entered was in the amount 
specifically prayed for in the complaint, to-wit, $55,200.00 
plus interest at 8 peicent per year from October 1, 1979 to 
July 29, 1981, which is $8,066.00, for a total of $63,266.00, 
plus attorney's fees. (R-39 and Exhibit "C" hereto) 
4. The security sold to defendant Mills (the 
promissory note) recited on its face that it was for "the sum 
of FIFTY-FIVE THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED DOLLARS ($55,200.00) 
principal payable on maturity of the note." (R-11, 
underlining added). It also contains the undescribed and 
unexplained figure of $48,000.00 on the top line thereof, 
which is not identified in the note as being the "principal" 
thereof. 
5. The security (promissory note) provided on its 
face for interest "at the rate of thirty percent (30%) per 
annum" both before and after judgment and was dated October 1, 
1979. (R-11) 
6. Interest on the principal sum of $55,200.00 from 
October 1, 1979 to date of judgment, July 29, 1981, would have 
amounted to $31,628.00, making the amount due on the 
promissory note as of the date of judgment $86,828.00. 
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7. The trial court held a hearing on the question of 
damages, and took evidence under oath that the amount stated 
in the promissory note as "principal" ($55,200.00) was the 
consideration paid for the security: that no income had heen 
received on the security to the knowledge of the witness~ and 
that $5,000.00 was a reasonable attorney's fee. (R-36 for the 
trial court's recital that he had examined the issues and 
taken testimony~ and the affidavit of David Eccles Hardy, 
Exhibit "D" hereto, as to the content of the evidence taken.) 
8. The judgment actually entered as damages, 
calculated under the standard set in Section 61-l-22(l)(b) of 
the Utah Uniform Securities Act, was $23,562.00 less than the 
judgment would have been had it been entered as a simple 
calculation of the amount then due under the promissory note. 
9. Execution was issued on the judgment and was 
stayed pending appeal. (R-73 thru 75) 
10. Mills had sold some $2,000,000.00 of securities 
such as were sold to plaintiffs; many claims might be asserted 
against Mills; and setting aside the judgment, thus dep~iving 
it of its priority in point of time will imperil, iE not 




THE APPELLATE COURT PREMISED ITS DECISION 
ON ERRONEOUS ASSUMPTIONS OF FACT AND LAW. 
-11-
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The ~ppellate court made the following erroneous or 
unsupported assumptions of fact and law: 
1. That the trial court failed to follow the 
procedure provided in Rule 55(b)(2), U.R.C.P., in entering 
judgment against Mills in that it failed to take evidence of 
damages computed according to the statutory provisions of the 
applicable portions of the Securities Act; 
2. That the trial court failed to comply with the 
provisions of Rule 54(c)(2), U.R.C.P., mandating that a 
default judgment may not be different in kind from or exceed 
in amount that specifically prayed for in the complaint; 
3. That judgment was entered on the amount provided 
in the promissory note as if it were a sum certain rather than 
on the damages provided for under Section 61-l-22(l)(b) of the 
Utah Uniform Securities Act; and 
4. That the promissory note showed on its face that 
it was for the principal sum of $48,000.00, rather than 
$55,200.00. 
It should be stated up front that petitioners can see 
quite readily how this Court could have reached the faulty 
factual premise that the trial court did not take evidence on 
the issues of damages at the time of the entry of the Order 
for Final Judgment. Appellant, on page 13 of his brief, after 
claiming that all elements of the cause against Mills had to 
have been proved in the evidence at the time of judgment, 
-12-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
stated that "no evidence on any of these issues was presented 
to the court." Respondent, in answering Appellant's claim 
that each and every element of a cause has to be proven on 
default, pressed the argument that there was no need for 
evidence other than that of reasonableness of attorney's 
fees--an argument that was without merit and failed to point 
out that the trial court's hearing had in fact included the 
requisite testimony as to damages. 
It should also be noted that if defendant Mills had 
not defaulted but instead had properly entered upon his own 
defense, he may very well have placed before the trial court 
evidence that less than $55,200.00 had been paid by the 
Russells, or that some income had been received by the 
Russells--but he did not do so. 
Appellant, on pages 14 and 15 of his brief, ceferring 
to the contested affidavit of Mills as if it were a finding of 
fact, stated that some interest payments were not taken into 
consideration in calculating the judgment. However, in his 
own affidavit (R-58) Mills states, in the last sentence of 
paragraph 6, as follows: "Defendant states on information and 
belief that credit has been given for these payments but that 
the interest has been incorrectly calculated such that the 
Judgment is for more than Defendant could otherwise be legally 
obligated to pay the Plaintiffs." 
-13-
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The great risk of defaulting is that the amount 
claimed in the Complaint and the amount found as damages may 
be a sum greater than would have been awarded had the trial 
court had the benefit of the defendant's knowledge by way of 
countervailing testimony. 
Essentially, the point of this petition is factual. 
Respondents do not argue with the appellate court's conclusion 
that Rules 54(c)(2) and 55(b)(2) applied to the proceedings 
below, nor do Respondents contend that Section 61-l-22(l)(b) 
of the Utah Uniform Securities Act does not set the standard 
for damages. 
Respondents.contend that the appellate court misread 
the recorrl and/or Respondents' argument respecting the proof 
below and made erroneous factual conclusions or assumptions 
with relation thereto. The Statement of Fact, supra, shows 
the facts as the record and explanatory affidavits respecting 
the trial court's actions establish them. 
The appellate opinion held the judgment below 
defective because "of the failure of the trial court to follow 
Rule 55(b)(2)," but the fact is that the trial court followed 
Rule 55(b)(2) to the full extent required where a defendant 
has defaulted. 
The appellate opinion concluded that the hearing on 
damages dealt only with attorney's fees. This is simply 
contrary to the fact. See Exhibits "D," "E" and "F" hereto. 
-i4-
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The appellate opinion concluded that judgment ~as 
entered as if for a sum certain, to-wit, the sum due under the 
promissory note. The fact is that the judgment would have 
been greater by $23,562.00 had this been true, assuming the 
figure used as principal to be $55,200.00. Had the principal 
amount of the note been shown by the evidence before the trial 
court to have been $48,000.00 instead of $55,200.00 and the 
judgment been entered on the note ($48,000.00 plus interest at 
30 percent per year for 23 months less two days), the amount 
of the judgment would have been $48,000.00 plus $27,520.00 
interest, for a total of $75,520.00--instead of $63,266.00, 
the amount awarded--a difference of $12,254.00. 
Simply observing the mathematics of what took place 
below conclusively shows that the legal measure set forth in 
Section 61-1-22 was, in fact, utilized by the trial court, 
which applied the evidence before it to the legal standacd for 
damages and came up with the amount awarded. The mathematical 
analysis establishes beyond doubt that the facts of what took 
place at the damage hearing were exactly as recited in the 
Hardy affidavit (Exhibit "D" hereto). 
POINT II 
THE ALLEGED MISTAKES OF FACT GO 
TO THE HEART OF THE DECISION. 
It seems apparent that if the appellate court decided 
that the judgment below must be modified for the reasons that 
-15-
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(1) the hearing below did not take evidence of damages but was 
on attorney's fees only, but that is an error of fact; (2) the 
requirements of Rule ,5(b)(2) were not followed, but in fact 
the trial court did follow those requirements; (3) the 
judgment differs from the specific prayer of the Complaint in 
violation of Rule 54(c)(2), but in fact the judgment is 
precisely the amount specifically prayed for in the Complaint~ 
and (4) the statutory measure of damages provided in Section 
61-1-22 of the Utah Uniform Securities Act was not followed, 
but in fact that statutory measure is exactly what the trial 
court applied to the evidence before it; then the overlooked 
or misconstrued facts go to the very heart of the appellate 
court's rationale, and are, therefore, material. 
Such is the case here. 
POINT III 
IF THE APPELLATE COURT DECLINES TO REHEAR, 
IT SHOULD REMAND THE EXISTING JUDGMENT FOR 
MODIFICATION WITHOUT VACATING THE SAME. 
As was pointed out in the Statement of Facts above, 
Respondents believed, alleged by affidavit and still are 
informed and believe that an appellate decision which deprives 
the judgment below of its position in time and modifies the 
amount to which plaintiffs are entitled thereunder may well 
effectively deprive Respondents, who were diligent in pursuit 
of their rights, of their remedy because of other judgments or 
claims against, or obligations of the Defendant-Appellant, or 
-16-
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because it would then open the opportunity for Appellant to 
dispose of his property during the time needed for fl1rther-
hearing below. 
Rule 60(b) perP"tits relief from a final judgment ''upon 
such conditions as are just." Where it is determined that 
entry of judgment on default was improper with~)ut holding an 
inquest to assess damages, judgment should be permitted to 
stand as security pending final disposition of the action. 
Reynolds Securities, Inc. v. Underwriters Bank & Trust 
Company, 44 N.Y. 2d 568, 378 N.E. 2d 106 (1978)~ Treitel v. 
Arno 1 d Ch a i t , Ltd • , 2 0 A • D • 2 d 7 11 , 2 4 7 N • Y • S . 2 d 3 7 3 { 1 9 6 4 ) • 
Similarly, a court should adopt reasonable measures 
to protect rights accrued under judgment either hy requiring 
proper bond as a condition to vacating judgment or by opening 
the judgment for further proceedings and at the same time 
permitting the original judgment, execution, and lien to stand 
as security for the ultimate judgment. Halliburton v. 
Illinois Life Insurance Company, 40 P.2d 1086 (Okla. 1935). 
In most cases, where relief is sought by a party 
against whom a default judgment has been rendered, the 
interests of justice would seem to be best served by opening 
up the judgment and granting a hearing on damages, thus 
retaining the lien of the judgment pending the outcome of such 
hearing, rather than vacating the judgment outright. State v. 
Schultz, 260 Wis. 395, 50 N.W. 2d 922 (1952); Buckley v. Park 
-17-
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Building Corporation, 27 Wis. 2d 425, 134 N.W. 2d 666 {1965). 
See generally, 46 AmJur 2d 948, Judgments Section 787, Liens 
and Security; 98 A.L.R. 1380, "Duty of court upon opening 
default to defer vacation of judgment or order until result of 
trial on merits." 
CONCLUSION 
Respondents respectfully submit that this appellate 
court has premised its opinion that the judgment herein should 
be reversed and remanded for modification on assumptions of 
fact which are erroneous and on misconstrued or overlooked 
material facts respecting the proceedings of the trial court. 
The trial court did exactly what the opinion herein says it 
should have done. This appellate court, now that these facts 
are brought to its attenti"on, should conform its opinion with 
the actual facts and affirm the judgment below. 
In light of the teaching of Mendelson v. Roland, 
supra, this is the time to request any clarification of the 
appellate court's ruling and instruction to the trial court 
that a litigant deems needed. Respondents, relying upon the 
authorities cited above and the particular circumstances of 
this case, request this Court, in the event it rejects 
Respondents' petition to rehear and correct its opinion, to 
-18-
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make clear that the judgment remains in place as of the time 
of its entry and is to be modified in amount only. 
-19-
Respectfully submitted, 
TANNER, BOWEN & TANNER 
Earl o. Tanner, Sr. 
1020 Beneficial Life Tower 
36 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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EXHIBITS 
EXHIBIT "A" - Decision of this Court in the matter 
filed January 30, 1984 
EXHIBIT "B" - Order for Final Judgment (R-36) 
EXHIBIT "C" - Judgment of Trial Court (R-39) 
EXHIBIT "D" - Affidavit of David Eccles Hardy 
EXHIBIT "E" - Affidavit of the Honorable Jay E. Banks 
EXHIBIT "F" - Affidavit of Pat Jones 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
"1111 
I hereby certify that on theJ- day of March, 1984, 
two (2) true and correct copies of the foregoing RESPONDENTS' 
PETITION FOR REHEARING AND BRIEF IN SUPPORT THERBOF wet"e 
hand delivered to: 
BACKMAN, CLARK & MARSH 
Ralph J. Marsh 
800 Mcintyre Building 
68 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
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'•.,•. 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
----00000----
David Russell and Eileen Russell, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
v. ,;. 
Sterling .B. Martell, dba Martell 
Holding Company, Grant C. Mills, 
et al. , 
No. 18160 
F I L E D 
Januai-y 30, 1984 
Defendants and Appellants. Geoffrey J. Butler, Clerk 
-·:. t.. - _,., ' ... ... .• . ,,. - ....... ~ -
1: {·HOWE, Justice: 
. Appellant Grant C. Mills seeks the reversal of 
\.-the tri•i .. court•s denial of bis motion to set aside a default 
·.~:·judgmen:t,.-:'_-wqi~b : ~.d. been entered against him. 
·. ·. , : ·. .: ... ~:r·:· . .t ·> . ·-~ . . . ~ .. .: . 
,. "· :·. 
· :·~-·.On July 7, · 1981 Mills was served with a summons· and 
a copy ·ot·:~the plaintiffs' complaint. When he did not file an 
;:::. answer in response, his default was entered by the court. 
: ··.After an ex pa.rte bearing on a motion made by plaintiffs for 
:~_ ... judgm~nt,.·· .. judgment was granted for $63,200, attorney's fees . 
. of $5.,o.oo·~and costs of the action. In December of 1981 Mills 
·::··filed a motion to. set aside the default judgment supported by· 
1
> affidavits·. Plaintiffs, David Russell and Eileen Russell t 
:."·also t1l•d···at:f~dav1ts in _opposition to the mqtion. 
;{ . _::;;_._· ~·;'.1 ·.,: ~-....... -~>·t ':.!:'. . . • . 
)}~~ ;·: ., · rn~ bi·s :·affidavit •. Mills claimed to have sent bis· sum-
·:,·:~mons ~~d copy ot· the complaint to his attorney to be handled 
:; .·.by him •.. :.He was. located in. another city and was also represent-
·, .:.ing other co-defendants in this case. The attorney, because 
· of confusion in his office, failed to tile an answer in Mills' 
· behalf. After a writ of execution was issued against his 
· · prope.f.tY . i·n Nov.ember, Mills retained anpther at·t·orney who .. -: .... -· , .... ··,~:·: 
,::~ filed .. th.e·>motion<:1··to :set· as-ide, the :Judgment~ Mills claimed ~:·i.. • 
·that be bad not· taken action more quickly because he had relied 
_ upon representations of the clerk of the court who he telephoned 
· that no judgment bad been entered against him • 
. : On the other band, Mr. Russell swore that on July 15 
~.Mills informed him that he intended to take no action on the 
·; summon·s. an·d complaint. In an affidavit by Russell 's attorney- 1 
~.~·:he stated. tb;at on August 18 he informed Mills in a telephone 
· .conversatipn ... _that a. default judgment had been taken against 
~ him. ; Ullls,· r,Jtpl~ed. th•t he felt no legal obligation to Rus-
:;_.·sell and di~· not: :t·eel motivated by the lawsuit to address Rus-
:(Sell 's claime.:.·.'.~~;.?Je.ttber ot these statements was denied by Mills • 
.. '. : ·.~ ... - . :• ~.'. ::;~~~·· (r·.~.; :~. . . . ! : 
.. '.· . ~ '- _1.•: ~ . ; . 
• j· 
, • • • •• - l ·~ • • -: ·' • 
. . ':,-·, 
,.:._:·,. 
'\ ~ ... 
' : ~· i ' 
,;;·.· .\. . :. (.\>~·~, :~· ·~ .· ~ ·:.~:-· 
:··-. EXHIBI"T·· "A" 
-i.: 
: : 
~f : . ... . •• 
. . 
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Upon review of the affidavits, the trial court denied 
Mills' motion to set aside the judgment. An order to stay 
the execution of Mills' property pending this appeal was en-
tered thereafter. 
I. 
Mills' first point is that the trial court ibused 
its discretion· in refusing to set aside the default judgcent. 
Rule 60(b) of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides for 
relief from a judgment, states in pertinent part: 
.... _: . 
. ~ . ", 
'-of·:-';.. .• 
! ~· .;:_·.I'~-
• ~: ~ • ·,, • I ... 
. . . 
.. 
', I ~ 
~On motion and upon such terms as are just. 
: .. the· ·cou.rt may in the furtheranc.e of justice 
• ... : .. ~~.:.relieve a party· or his lega_l. _ ~epf,esentati.ve 
from a final judgment, order, or proceeding 
:for .the following reasons: (1) mistake, in-
: advertance, surprise, or excusable neglect; 
·_ > > ··:·~·)·.~:~:.: •. : .. :. or ( 7) any. other reason justifying 
relief from the operation of· the judgment. 
The motion shall be made within a reason~ble 
time.and for [reason] (1) ••• not more 
:·:" .. · .. ·:·.,than· three months after the judgment, order • 
. (< .. ._: .. · l or proceeding was entered or· taken. 
Mills' alaims that the circumstances here do not fall within 
subparagraph (1), with whose three month time limitation 
·'., .. ·~ he did not comply. Rather, he argues, the judgment should 
have been· se~ aside under subp•ragraph (7) since despite his 
·!·::· diligence.he failed to timely answer the c~mplaint. 
.. · .. 
Broad.discretion is accorded the trial court in 
-- rulitig.on relief from a judgment; and, this Court •ill re-
... 
. 1 verse that ruling only if it is clear the trial court abused 
. . its d!.sqr.e:tion •.. Valley Leasing v. Houghton, Utah, 661 P.2d 959 
~-.·,:::". ( 1983) ;:_· :l~e·a:t.P.:,~;Y~~·.:. Mowtlr, _Utah, --:;597 P. 2d 8!>5.~ ( ~$~9); Airkem . 
4.~Li1.lnte:rincmn;J:i«f:.tj2~\:.'.:,fnc:a-1·:·Y ~":~:·iP_a:r:keP ~,~. ~O:.JJ.Ylt-!~~.6:~:~.§~~~;;;.~. ~d 429 - (19,7,;J) ! ~ 
. . -
. ·~~':·· :_. . . 
·.,·;-:-·-~·:. .· We have held that subparagraph 7 may not be resorted 
. ·.·to for relief when the ground asserted for relief falls within 
-~0: subparagraph 1. Pitts v. McLachlan, Utah, 567 P.2d 171 (1977); 
· : ..; .. Calder Bros. Co. v ~ :Anderson , Utah , 652 P. 2d 922. ( 1982) ; Laub 
··· . v. South Central Telephone Ass'n, Utah, 657 P.2d 1304 (1982); 
·:::."· .. Gardiner.'• Gardiner Builders v. Swapp, Ut~h. 656.P.2d 429 (1982) 
.. ;·:-.::-~ ,··:Otherwisei, .. the _._three month limitat~Qn imposed on. rel,ief under 
:·r·.:- subpa~.agr~p~··l is. averted. . . · · ·, .. · .'i 
'': • :~!• :, ' ' : ,: ' .. •• ' I I • . ' ' ' ' ~ .. ; , ~ : ~ 
.·.1, .. · .. :~' ~'~I·,:. ... ~ : ,:·•: ·.<' :~·" I ~ ,!", 
·'.:'<>·.·: . : ·; :· · .::< .How~.,,er,. even assuming that· subparagraph 'I is avail-
;i :;~.tr> able··~tQ M·11.1s ,. his. undeni.ed statements that he felt no legal 
'.~'. 1i!i~:1<.. oblig:at1on to respond to the plaintiffs' claims support tbe · · 
~~;~t}~r;:::. tri~~,;> .. ~.o~rt 's -deni.al of bis motion. Those statements evince 
·~~·:::~~o. ;~;~~~_;:"' :' ':. .. -2- ;. · ,.~ . . . . : .. 
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a ~uraplaie indifference by him and negate any diligence on 
his part in pursuing the opportunity to defend. Further, any \ 
neglect by Mills' attorney is attributable to Mills through 
. principles of agency. Gardiner l Gardiner Builders v. Swapp, 
:;~.supra •.. ;.We find under these facts no abuse of discretion by 
· the trial court in denying relief from the judgment • 
. ·· II. 
Although we will not disturb the default of Mills, we 
do hold under the authority of Pitts v. Pine Meadow Ranch, Inc .• 
J Utah, 589 P.2d 767 (1978), and J.P.W. Enterprises, Inc. v. 
Naef, Utab, 604 P.2d 486 (1979), that the judgment against Mills 
must be reversed because of the failure of the trial court to 
follow Rule 55(b)(2) of tne Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Rule 54(c)(2) and. Rule 55 prescribes the procedure to be foll.owed 
by trial.courts in.entering judgcents against detaulting par-
_.ties. .Court.a •re: not a.t liberty to deviate from those rules just 
::·~because: on•·· part.y ·is ·in default and· is not entitled to be beard 
_on the merits of the case. For example, Rule 54(c)(2) provides 
:that a judgment'bg default may not be different in kind from or 
exceed in amount that specifically prayed for in the demand for 
judgment. See Hayes v. Towles, 95 Idaho 208, 506 P.2d 105 
(1973).· Another rule governing the entry of default judgments 
is Rule 55(b)(2), which is applicable in the instant case. It 
iprovides that when the plaintiff's claim is for other than a sum 
.. <lertain or:' an amount that by computation can be made certain, judg-
· ment by.default may not be entered by the clerk of the court, but 
.must bee.entered by the court, which may conduct suqb hearings 
. and take·· au.ch evidence as is necessary to determine the dam- ... 
~·'-ages. ·. I'Jl· the i~stant case, plaintiffs seek damages under · 
~~,u.c.A., .. 1953, .... S. 61-l-22(l)(b), part of the Utah Uniform Se-
.. :·curitiea~.,Act;,· -.. ~hich .provides that an aggrieved party may 
·-· 
( ... ,. 
:.'.~·~-.--d~".'>[Jt]ecover the consideration paid tor the 
: ... ;;::: : security' together with interest at as per 
· . ·:: .. : (year from the date of payment, costs, and 
."".;;:· .::·'. reasonable attorney's fees. less the amount. 
;:_· .. of any· income received on the security, upon 
· · the tende.r'" of the securi.ty or for damages: ... ---~· . 
:~~~!!~~;:!~~.i~~~b~~~ 1no longeir. owns· the .ae·cu·r1·t.y·. · o:~.-.>-:: .-:~ ~-·<; , · .. . · 
';- •: ,. ·' ~ ... - : . . .. - . ' ' ' : . 
..: .. ~ ··.eto-~~.r-···~.,..: 
·~· Accordlri:g;::_·to _!the pll!intitfs' complaint, Mills act.ed as a securi-
:·ties agent without having been registered, and he made untrue 
~represent•tions to the plainiiffs concerning the se~urity 
'pledged. to secure the note in violation of our Securities Act • 
. The promissory. note that he sold the plaintiffs was f,or 
$48,000 principal. It was due in. six months at which time 
$7,200 in interest would accrue, making a total of $55,200 
due. Howe~er, it is not alleged in the complaint that $48,000 
•· ~ ; r ;. 
. . . -.... ... ·~ .. . . . 
. · .. :-. ·: 
'• . 
~ .. 
. ~ . 
: ~. .... . . ~ . -3- No •.. 18160 
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was paid for the note and under the statute plaintiffs are 
limited to t·he recovery of· the consideration paid for the 
security.. That being the case, the plaintiffs' claims for 
damages ag.inst Mills were not for sums certain und under 
Rule 55(b)(2) a hearing should have been conducted by the 
. trial court to ascertain the amount of the damages to which the 
._.:_:::plaintiffs were entitled. Furthermore, under § 61-l-22(l)(b), 
:i ~- evidence should have been adduced as to the amount of income, 
'.::;· if any, the plaintiffs had received on the security (which 
-~.~Mills claims was $16,800) so that it could be deducted in the 
: . calc~l~tion of the plaintiffs' damages. Although it appears 
· _·. that· a ··hearing was held,. it dealt only with the reasonableness 
~~Jlf _:t;h:~--~~1;~~Ji.q'.~;~8::·fees to. be· ,awarded .the plaintlffs. 
•• I • ' :t• • "''•- • ' .. • •; M•~ a", ,,.- •' ' ' :. A • ~ • '• .:.: • • • _,. •' 
. The judgment below is reversed on this point, and -
'.-'·.:·:.. .. the c:a~·• is remanded to the trial court for further proceed-
'.1<·;,. ings ,in. c.on:tormity with this opinion. No costs on appeal are 
.:·_· ..... awarQ~d •. ->.:·._;::··;/:;. -i: .· . . 
·_]~~>~~:;_·. :• ( ; : ... > ·. . . -· : · .
. ;/; ;; : . ' ; ~· ,, 
' •, 
' ' I ' ~ 
l:' _·':':•: 
i .<··::~:_,;:~~-~:/.\F:~--: 
.~ .. ;. ::·).::='.:., .. · ' .' 
:-\1:;):f' : , . WE CONCUR 
' ;·. ~ . ' · . . :. 
. -~·-i·=·-: .~. ·; ... :· 
. ' : . -" . '.,·( 
---
:.:·, Gordon·.·R~-'K~ii.·· Chief Justic.e 
riD:: : . :>·{:::. iXi.'.1/-,, · .. 
~'{,;·Dalli·~: .H.· ;O~ks, Justice 
, : !' ... · 
: . .. ·:. ~1 , • ' ~ 
.. ~ .. -
I. Daniel Stewart, Justice , 
Christine M. Durham, Jusice 
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5 Attorna,. for. Plaintiffs 
IN CLERK'S OFFICE 
Salt Lake County, Utah 
JUL 2 9 1981 
6 IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
7 STATE OF UTAH 
8 ----00000----
9 DAVID RUSSELL and EILEEN 






STERLING B. MARTELL, GRANT 
13 c. MILLS, et al., 
Defendants. 
ORDER FOR FINAL 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No. CBl-5226 
----00000----




















Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure granting final 
judgment upon the claims set forth in plaintiffs' Complaint 
as to Defendant GRANT c. MILLS, having come on for hearing 
ex parte, and the Court having examined the issues and taken 
testimony and being fully advised in the premises, now therefore: 
I 
IT IS DETERMINED, that there is no just reason for 
delay in the entry of final judgment against Defendant GRANT 
Co MILLS on this order; and it is ordered that plaintiffs' 
motion for final judgment against Defendant GRANT c. MILLS 
be and the same hereby is granted; and that the Clerk of this 
Court enter a final judgment upon the order herein against 
Defendant GRANT c. MILLS as prayed, with atttorney•s fees 
fixed at $5,000. 
. -d.,,_ 
DATED this 71 day of July, 1981. 
BY THE COURT 
t/ 
I E~HIBIT "B" I 
36 
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FILED IN CLEHK'S OFFICE 
Salt Laka Cvunty, Utah 
JUL 2 9 1981 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF l1l'AH 
----00000---- ~-1'. I 6 s UC} I ,z 7 /) t 
DAVID RUSSELL and EILEEN 
RUSSELL, his wife, 
: 7 - J b - I 1 I: :z 'I IT .l( ~ 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
STERLING B. MARTELL, GRANT 
C. MILLS, et al., 
Defendants. 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No. CSl-5226 
----00000----
An Order having been entered herein .on the tlf''J.ay 
of July, 1981, for final judgement upon the claims set forth 
in plaintiffs' Complaint as to Defendant GRANT c. MILLS, and 
the Court having certified therein that there was no just 
reason for delay, and expressly directed the entry of final 
judgment, naw therefore, 
IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that plaintiffs 
have judgment against Defendant GRANT c. MILLS for the sum 
of SIXTY-THREE THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED SIXTY-SIX DOLLARS ($63,266), 
together with attorney's fees in the amount of FIVE THOUSAND 
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1020 BENEFICIAL LIFE TOWERS 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
DAVID RUSSELL and EILEE~ 




STERLING D. MARTELL, 
d/b/a/ MARTELL HOLDI~G 
COMPA~Y, et al., and 
GRA~T C. MILLS, 
Defendants -
Appellants. 
STATE OF UTAH 



















AFFIDAVIT OF DAVID ECCLES 
HARDY 
Supreme Court ~o. 18160 
DAVID ECCLES HARDY, being duly sworn upon his oath, 
deposes and says: 
1. I am now and on July 29, 1981 was a member in good 
standing of the Bar of the State of Utah. 
2. Prior to and on July 29, 1981 I was employed by the 
EXHIBIT "D" 
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1 firm of Tanner, Kesler, Rust ann Williams and was assistino Earl 
2 D. Tanner, Esq. in the services heinq performed for and on behalf 





























iLT LAq Crry 
UTAH 84111 • 
01) 313·8588 
3. In the course of such service, I prepared the 
Default Certificate (R-38), Plaintiffs' Motion for Order for 
Final Judgment Against Defenrlant Grant C. Mills (R-37), Order fo~ 
Final Judgment (R-36) and Judqme~t (R-39), and personally filed 
the same with the Third Judicial District Court in the form in 
which they now appear in the record, save and except for 
notations made by the said Clerk and the Honorable J. E. Banks, 
District Judge, who heard the default and ex parte motion. 
4. I have an independent memory of the proceedings 
before Judge Banks with respect to the said pleadings. Further, 
I have reviewed my notes and the documents which were presented 
to the Court, signed and entered in the said cause. 
5. I submitted the said pleadings to Judge Banks, who 
was then assigned the law and motion calendar in the Thira 
Judicial District: he looked over the file and the proposed 
default, order and judgment, and, after expressing some 
uncertainty as to whether it was possible to obtain judgment with 
respect to fewer than all of the named defendants in the cause, 
asked me to come back at a later time after he had had a chance 
to review the papers and the rules of procedure. I left the 
pleadings with him and arranged to return in the afternoon. 
6. I do not recall with certainty whether I met with 
Judge Banks before the afternoon law and motion calendar or after 
-2-
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1 the same. 
2 7. I spent approximately one-half (1/2) hour with Judqe 
3 Banks discussing the rules permitting the entry of the judgment 
4 against fewer than all of the defendants in the action, the 
5 proposed pleadings and the evidence, and Judge Banks consenterl to 
6 take evidence and enter an order and judgment. 
7 8. I was sworn by Judge Banks as neither his clerk nor 
8 reporter were present and proceeded to testify with respect to 
9 damages and to attorneys' fees. I produced the original 
10 Promissory Note which is Exhibit "A" to the Complaint herein and 
11 testified that to the best of my information and belief the sum 
12 of $55,200 had been paid by plaintiffs for said obligation, that 
13 it had been paid on the date of the note and that no income had 
14 been received on the obligation. This was my understanding and I 
15 so testified. In addition, I testified that the sum of $5,000 
16 was reasonable for attorneys' fees in this cause. 
17 9. Thereafter Judge Banks signed the Order for Final 
18 Judgment and Judgment therein. I do not recall whether I 
19 delivered them to his Clerk for attestation and entry, or whether 
20 Judge Banks retained the documents and transmitted them to the 
21 Clerk himself. 
22 I~ WIT~ESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my name and seal 








IUTH STATS STRUT 
1
1 
LT L.\q CITY 
UTAH 8411 I ' ' ~• > aea.asaa I 
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Residing at::dtua/~  
MY COMMISSIO~ EXPIRES: 
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I~ THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
DAVID RUSSELL and EILEE~ 




STERLI~G D. MARTELL, 
d/b/a/ MARTELL HOLDI~G 
COMPANY, et al., and 
GRAr~T C. MILLS, 
Defendants -
Appellants. 
STATE OF UTAH 
County of Salt Lake ) 
SS. 
) 
) AFFIDAVIT OF THE 
) HO~ORABLE JAY E. BANKS 
) 










The Honorable JAY E. BA~KS, having been duly sworn upon 
his oath, deposes and says that: 
I. I am, and at all times relevant to this affidavit 
was, a duly appointed Judge of the Third Judicial District Court. 
* * * 
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l 2. On July 29, 1981 I was assigned to the Law and 
·2 Motion Division of said Court and handled the duties of that 
3 assignment on said date. 
4 3. I have reviewed the file in the above-entitlen case 
5 and have examined the pleadinqs which I signed therein. 
6 4. I am the Judge who signed the documents in said case 
7 which are designated as "Order for Final Judgment" (R-36) and 
8 "Judgment" {R-39) and am the person who entered the date upon 






















I IT ATE STREET I 
L.\q CITY, : 
.. 84111 I asa.asaa 
5. I have no independent recollection of signing said 
pleadings nor of the circumstances preceding their siqninq. 
IN WIT~BSS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set rny hand and seal 
this 15-a. day of February, 1984. 
The Jay E. Banks, Judge 
Subscrihed and sworn to before me this /~day of 
7li:::;f: 19 8 4 • 
c ;;sMZ~ «i£ ~k<-7-A!-~~ 
~OTARY PUBLIC 
Residing at~ 
-------~.;'._~-C ~_,,/--<- ~.Z7. 2-L~/_./ 
MY COMMISSIO~ EXPIRES~ 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
DAVID RUSSELL and EILEE~ 
















AFFIDAVIT OF PAT JO~ES 




STERLI~G D. MARTELL, 
d/b/a/ MARTELL HOLDI~G 
COMPANY, et al., and 
GRANT C. MILLS, 
Defendants -
Appellants. 
Supreme Court ~o. 18160 
20 STATE OF UTAH ) 
: SS. 








PAT JO~ES, being duly sworn upon her oath, deposes and 
says: 
1. I now am, and on July 29, 1981 was, the Deputy 
County Clerk assigned to the work of the Honorable Jay E. Banks, 
District Judge in the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake 
EXHIBIT "F" 
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1 County, Stat~ of Utah. 
2 2. On July 29, 1981 those pleadinqs in the 
3 above-entitled case consisting of the "Order for Final Judgment" 
4 (R-36) and "Judgment" (R-39) were signed and dated by Jay E. 
5 Banks, District Judge, and thereafter delivered to me as is 
6 indicat~d by my attestation of Judge Banks' signature at on the 
7 bottom of each of said pleadings. 
8 3. Although I do not have an independent memory of this 
9 case, the usual procedure at that time was to make a copy of 
10 ex parte orders in lieu of a minute entry, as is more fully set 




















tH 8TA1- 9TRQT 
' L\Ka Crry, 
rAH 84U t 
> Ha-asaa 
Dated ·this ag u~ day of February, 1984. 
Pat Jories 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this ,;1. ~ day of 
February, 198 4. 
MY COMMISSIO~ EXPIRES: 
1/ - ----7 _, z, 2- - r :s 
~OTARY PUBLIC 
Residing at Salt 
\. 
City, UT 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
IN RE MINUTE ENTRIES 
ON ADMINISTRATIVE OH.DER 
EX PARTE ORDERS AND JUDGMENTS 
It is hereby ordcrcJ that: Llw establisht:!d policy and 
proceJures requiring court clerks Lu prepare and file minute 
entries whenever an ex parte order is signed by a judge is changed 
. 
and modified as hereinaft:l'r set forLh, such order to becomt ~ffec-
tive on March 1, 1980. 
On all ex parte urJers including default judgments, orders 
of dismissal on stipulation. and any othe! order not based upon a 
prior in-court ruling, the procedural requirement that a copy of 
a minute entry reflecting the signing of such order by the court 
be placeJ in the judge's minute enLry file shall be met by plating 
a photostatic copy of such order in t.he judge'~ minute entry file 
in lieu of the preparation and filing of a regular minute entry 
form. The placing of the signed order in the case file will it-
self obviate the need for a minute entry with respect thereto being 
placed in the c~se file. 
Dated this 29th Jay of ~ebruary, 1980 . 
. t· ,~ / 
. . :1.1 ( ,~_/;,., Ii· J.. 
---- ·-. .<7?. -·-- 11'--=1~;1;£--,.:-0) ____ _ -~' q~ /}')L 
H. ___ :L.n..:-1. tL K.W-.L--~. 1:~.J.JLLL._ I ~,,... - . -.. .._/ 
. i/' ./ ..,. {. \. . '·""' ( '- ,. 
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